Which smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept? The demand for compensation in a platform market by Pollitt, Michael & Richter, Laura-Lucia
Energy Economics 72 (2018) 436–450
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /eneco
Which smart electricity service contracts will consumers accept? The
demand for compensation in a platform market
Laura-Lucia Richter*, Michael G. Pollitt
Faculty of Economics and Energy Policy Research Group (EPRG), University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DD, UK
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 15 November 2016
Received in revised form 18 March 2018
Accepted 1 April 2018















A B S T R A C T
This paper analyses the heterogeneity of household consumer preferences for electricity service contracts
in a smart grid context. Platform pricing strategies that could incentivise consumers to participate in a two-
sided electricity platformmarket are discussed. The research is based on original data from a discrete choice
experiment on electricity service contracts that was conducted with 1,892 electricity consumers in Great
Britain in 2015. We estimate a flexible mixed logit model in willingness to pay space and exploit the results
in posterior analysis. The findings suggest that while consumers are willing to pay for technical support
services, they are likely to demand significant compensation to share their usage and personally identifying
data and to participate in automated demand response programs involving remote monitoring and control
of electricity usage. Cross-subsidisation of consumers combining appropriate participation payments with
sharing of bill savings could incentivise participation of the number of consumers required to provide the
optimal level of demand response. We also examine the preference heterogeneity to suggest how, by tar-
geting customers with specific characteristics, smart electricity service providers could significantly reduce
their customer acquisition costs.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In line with many other countries attempting to reduce car-
bon emissions and increase the use of renewable energy, the UK
government aims to integrate large quantities of intermittent wind
and solar into the electricity grid. Such renewable energy resources
result in variable electricity supply that must be matched with flex-
ible demand. The challenge is to improve monitoring and control
of generation, storage, transmission, distribution and consumption
of electricity such that supply and demand can be matched in real
time (Austin Energy, 2010). One way to achieve real-time matching
of demand and supply is via demand-side management (DSM), i.e.
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via intentional modifications of electricity consumption patterns to
alter the timing, level of instantaneous demand, or total electricity
consumption (Albadi and El-Saadany, 2007).1 DSM can be facilitated
by the integration of the electricity grid with information and com-
munication technology (ICT) as part of so-called ‘smart grids’.
Residential consumers have particular potential for smart tech-
nologies, smart contractual arrangements and DSM to facilitate the
balancing of supply and demand in real time, since the domestic sec-
tor makes up a large share of total electricity consumption.2 A ‘smart’
home incorporates a communication network that connects the key
1 There are twomain types of demand-side management (DSM) actions: firstly, load
interruption for short periods with minimal impact on consumer comfort. This can
provide frequency response energy services and is usually considered for appliances
that continuously use power (e.g. fridges and freezers). Secondly, demand shifting of
appliances that operate in limited duration cycles. This can provide standing reserve
and balancing energy services and is usually considered for appliances that consume
electricity during a fixed duration cycle (e.g. washing machines and tumble dryers).
2 In the UK, households consume around 30% of the total electricity consumed
across the year and up to 45% at peak times of the day.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.04.004
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electrical appliances and allows them to be remotely controlled,
monitored or accessed (Department for Trade and Industry, 2003). In
this context, ‘smart’ refers to the connection and communication of
different electrical devices in the home via the internet.
Smart home devices need to be distinguished from smart energy
services that emerge with the devices: smart home devices range
from smart electricity meters and smart household appliances to
integrated solar photovoltaic panels and electric vehicles that both
smartly consume and deliver electricity. The combination of these
devices, the data they provide and the control actions they enable
facilitate a wide range of smart home services (GSMA, 2011). We
consider an energy service as ‘smart’, if the power management
functionalities and the energy device management are due to spe-
cific algorithms, and if an integrated communication architecture
between grid and devices exists (Fraunhofer, 2014).3 Recent regu-
lation encourages consumer participation in electricity service con-
tracts that incentivise consumers to partly give up control over their
electricity devices to facilitate efficient grid management.
Electricity service providers can position themselves between
suppliers and consumers to bridge the gap between the smart tech-
nology and the required engagement of the consumer. However,
there is little empirical evidence to date as to which electricity
services consumers would choose, if they were offered a menu of
contracts bundling a variety of service components such as remote
and automated monitoring and control, data management, technical
support and electricity bill savings. While some of these attributes
might be valuable to the consumer, other attributes might only be
acceptable against some form of compensation.
Moreover, consumer valuations for the different service
attributes are likely to be heterogeneous: while some consumers
might value full automation and the ability to outsource control
of household devices to an expert third party, others might not
even be willing to delegate part of their control and monitoring of
their energy devices and usage against significant compensation. A
thorough analysis of such preference heterogeneity is crucial for the
design of electricity service contracts and an understanding, esti-
mation and prediction of the scope of feasible DSM under different
pricing/compensation schemes. The main questions in this paper
are therefore: how do household consumers value smart electricity
services, which contract terms would different consumer segments
accept and what does this imply for the optimal pricing strategies?
We estimate the demand for smart electricity services based on
a stated choice experiment conducted with 1892 electricity con-
sumers in Great Britain in 2015. Our demand model takes different
types of heterogeneity into account: a flexible mixed logit model
in willingness-to-pay (WTP) space is combined with posterior anal-
ysis to elicit consumer preferences and heterogeneity in valuations
for smart electricity services. This allows us to directly estimate not
only the consumers’ valuation of the bundled service, but also of the
distinct service components. We suggest possible pricing strategies
that could incentivise contract adoption by the number of customers
required to provide the optimal level of demand response. The find-
ings could inform competition authorities, regulators and smart
energy service providers and feed into future research in a smart
grid context in which customer heterogeneity can be exploited for
effective DSM.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background
on smart homes and smart energy services and on the relevant
literature. Section 3 presents the econometric model and estima-
tion strategy. Section 4 presents the discrete choice experiment
and experimental design. Section 5 presents the data and the main
results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 illustrates the practical
3 This definition is in line with the understanding of the European Commission in
the context of the Smart Vehicle-to-Grid Interface SMARTV2G project, for example.
implications of the results for electricity service contracts and pricing
strategies. Section 8 discusses limitations and suggestions for further
research and, finally, Section 9 concludes.
2. Smart electricity services & platformmarkets
2.1. The transition from traditional to smart grids
In the traditional electricity market, power flows from large gen-
erating stations via national/regional transmission networks on to
local distribution networks that connect to final customers. Network
operators ensure the matching of demand and supply and the main-
tenance of power quality at all times. This involves ensuring that
system frequency is maintained within narrow bounds, supply and
demand are instantaneously in balance and that there is adequate
reserve capacity on the system in the event of significant unfore-
seen changes in supply or demand by providing so-called ‘ancillary
services’. Network operators can be seen as ‘intermediaries’ between
producers and consumers. Traditionally, balancing is managed cen-
trally, at the transmission level rather than at the local distribution
level.
However, the electricity industry is structurally changing and
two main features characterise this transformation: firstly, the rapid
integration of intermittent, often highly distributed, renewable gen-
eration into the grid and, secondly, the integration of ICT based
products and services. These features enable increasingly flexible
DSM, change market definitions and create opportunities for innova-
tion in new products, services and business models. In contrast to
the traditional electricity system, balancing services can be offered
on the local distribution level.
Proposed solutions to the load balancing problem include the
introduction of dynamic (i.e. time varying) pricing and the remote
monitoring and control of consumer appliances (according to pre-
specified consumer preferences) to limit peak demand. Such DSM
services imply that consumers have to give up part of their con-
trol over devices and usage in exchange for more reliable electricity
supply. The optimal choice of DSM measures depends on market
conditions and the customer base.
The potential of the residential consumer as a flexible grid
resource is thus at the heart of the transition to a platform market in
residential electricity services. Consumers who are willing to adopt
the new technologies offer greater potential for flexible DSM than
consumers who are not.
Anaya and Pollitt (2017) discuss ‘smart’ energy focusing on three
dimensions: smart technical tools, smart engagement initiatives and
smart regulatory tools. Smart technical tools such as Active Network
Management (ANM) integrate different system control components
that allow the management of generation and load in real time,
which has allowed savings in some trials implemented by distribu-
tion network operators in the UK, for example. Smart engagement
initiatives, on the other hand, allow distributed generation (DG)
developers to be connected with interruptible capacity with the goal
to connect more DG cheaper and quicker. With the implementa-
tion of the so-called Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) scheme, for
example, the Office for Gas and Electricity Management (OFGEM)
aimed to not only test new technologies for facilitating more DG but
also smart commercial arrangements (Anaya and Pollitt, 2017). Such
commercial arrangements will usually require the implementation
of smart technical solutions. The use of smart technical tools and
smart engagement initiatives is also promoted by the use of smart
regulation which supports generators through the implementation
of different incentives and subsidy schemes for encouraging the
deployment of DG. This understanding is in line with our definition of
an energy service as ‘smart’, if the powermanagement functionalities
and the energy device management are due to specific algorithms,
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and if an integrated communication architecture between grid and
devices exists.
2.2. Platform markets
Generally, a multi-sided platform market is characterised by
1) the existence of one or more user groups linked by an interme-
diary, the platform provider, who coordinates their interactions and
2) the existence of network externalities, implying that the utility of
the platform users depends on the number of other users — either
on the same side or the other side of the platform (Eisenmann et al.,
2011). Weiller and Pollitt (2013) also consider ICT and the associated
complementary innovation as an essential component of platform
markets: they create added-value that increases utility to all user
groups.
Rochet and Tirole (2010) define multi-sided markets roughly
as ‘markets in which one or several platforms enable interactions
between end-users, and try to get the two (or multiple) sides ‘on
board’ by appropriately charging each side.’ Their examples of such
platforms include video game platforms (e.g., Nintendo, Sony Play
Station, and Microsoft X-Box), ‘which need to attract gamers in
order to convince game developers to design or port games to their
platform, and need games in order to induce gamers to buy and use
their video game console. Software producers court both users and
application developers.’ Rochet and Tirole (2010) also refer to the
examples of portals, TV networks, newspapers, and to payment card
systems that ‘need to attract both merchants and cardholders.’ These
are just few examples of platform markets.
In addition, in amulti-sided platformmarket the volume of trans-
actions between end-users depends on the structure and not only
on the overall level of the fees charged by the platform (Rochet and
Tirole, 2003). A platform’s usage or variable charges impact the two
sides’ willingness to trade once on the platform, and thereby their
net surpluses from potential interactions; the platforms’ member-
ship or fixed charges in turn condition the end-users’ presence on the
platform.
2.3. Smart electricity services platform markets
The emerging electricity market can be considered as a plat-
form market: firstly, match-making electricity service providers can
position themselves as intermediaries between the retailers, who
cannot predict their generation requirements, and consumers, who
start to participate in DSM. There are hence two sides of the market.
Retailers (and their associated generation) want to sell electricity to
consumers across the network, while residential consumers want
electricity services supplied across the network (platform). Services
provided by so-called energy demand aggregators, for example, can
be integrated with other platform services. Smart grid technology
allows aggregator firms to turn on generators or turn off electric-
ity for example from light, cooling, or heating at short notice, when
the national electricity system is congested. The aggregator firms can
then receive a fee for helping to balance the grid. Platform service
providers can act as intermediaries offering balancing services and
the question is: which side of the market should pay for it?
Secondly, there are network externalities. The system-level value
of smart energy services depends on the number of consumers sign-
ing up for them. The degree to which the retailers can effectively
match supply and demand, and hence deliver increased reliability,
depends on the number and the degree of engagement of the resi-
dential consumers (i.e. on users on the other side of the platform).
These are so-called cross-side externalities. Retailers have an interest
in helping the platform provider attract sufficient consumers as are
necessary to gain reliable aggregate control over their devices. There
are also same-side externalities: smart electricity service providers
are competing with each other to attract households.
Thirdly, the transaction volume between platform end-users
depends on the structure of the fees charged by the platform
provider. The optimal pricing strategy to attract users on each side of
the electricity service platform depends on the precise nature of the
externalities. In principle, a platform service provider can price its
service on both sides of themarket. It is also possible to take over part
or all of the costs of the platform for one side of themarket in order to
attract a sufficient number of users on the other side. As an example,
the platform providers could compensate consumers for their par-
ticipation in the platform, manage their electricity load and sell this
service to the retailers (and associated generators), who are likely to
be the main beneficiaries of the increased predictability of domestic
load. They benefit from cross-side network externalities in the sense
that predictability and manageability improve with the number of
customers participating. They could hence partly or fully pay for the
platform service to attract the number of customers required for the
provision of the optimal level of demand response. Whether such
cross-subsidisation via customer compensation is efficient depends
on the strength of the cross-side externalities (Weiller and Pollitt,
2013): if the network externalities are strong enough, i.e. as long as
the marginal cost of connecting an additional customer to the plat-
form is lower than the marginal value of its connection, the platform
provider can apply negative prices to the consumers and still col-
lect overall positive profits in equilibrium (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003;
Economides and Katsamakas, 2006).
To align the provision of smart electricity services with con-
sumer preferences and generate sufficient volume to gain competi-
tive advantages within the market, the pricing strategy of the service
provider should be based on preference andwillingness-to-pay anal-
ysis. Weiller and Pollitt (2013) suggest that the entry of competing
energy services platform providers could bring along a transition
from traditional transaction-based, marginal cost pricing of energy
to two-part tariffs with a subscription fee and a transaction-based
component.
2.4. Literature
Existing literature consistently confirms that demand flexibility
can be fostered effectively by a combination of economic incentives
and enhanced ICT (DECC, 2013). While customers under traditional
metering are likely to be unaware of their consumption and rates
paid, customers equipped with smart meters and in-house displays
receive real-time information on consumption and prices. While
many studies analyse the impact of smart technologies and other
DSM measures on load profiles, hardly any study quantifies how
consumers value the services that emerge with these technologies
and measures. In particular, there has been little analysis which
smart home service contracts consumers would choose, if they were
offered a menu of contracts bundling different services together to a
smart service contract. This paper fills this gap. Rather than investi-
gating the impact of smart technologies (such as remote monitoring
and control) on electricity consumption, we estimate whether and
how much consumers would be willing to accept or pay for smart
energy services that facilitate flexible DSM.
One of the few studies investigating customer views on the adop-
tion of smart home appliances is reported in Paetz et al. (2012).
The authors study consumer reactions to a fully furnished and
equipped smart home based on four focus groups with a total of
29 participants. The study was conducted in Germany and looked at
consumer perceptions of an energy management systemwhich opti-
mizes electricity consumption based on different ICT solutions. The
authors address variable tariffs, smart metering, smart appliances,
and home automation. Giving up high levels of flexibility and adapt-
ing everyday routines to fit in with electricity tariffs were regarded
as difficult by consumers. Smart appliances that take overmost of the
work on the consumer side were therefore considered necessary.
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Duetschke and Paetz (2013) suggest that future design of energy
(service) contracts needs to be transparent for customers and reflect
their individual preferences as customer acceptance of the new
technologies is essential for their effectiveness. They address con-
sumer preferences for different types of dynamic pricing. Their
results indicate heterogeneity in customer preferences regarding
dynamic prices and overall their results are in line with their ‘high-
comfort-low-price-presumption’.
Kaufmann et al. (2013) investigate smart meter perceptions of
electricity customers in Switzerland, but emphasize several limi-
tations of their study, offering the potential for further in depth
analysis of customer preferences for smart homes and metering
infrastructure. Silva et al. (2011) present a framework to assess the
value of smart appliances to increase system flexibility and to pro-
vide new sources of ancillary services. They derive the value of smart
appliances from the benefits of system efficiency, reduced operating
costs and carbon dioxide emissions and take the potential reduction
in comfort for the customer into account. While they recognise the
importance of consumer acceptance, customer preferences for smart
technologies or services are only touched upon briefly.
Further studies have been performed in the context of vehicle-to-
grid (V2G) connections. The European Commission’s Smart Vehicle-
to-Grid Interface Project SMARTV2G, for example, meant to connect
electric vehicles to the electric power grid by enabling controlled
flow of energy and power through safe, secure, energy efficient and
convenient transfer of electricity and data.4 The aim of SMARTV2G
was to ‘develop a new generation of technologies allowing the
seamless and user-friendly energy load of electric vehicles in urban
environments in the frame of an intelligent energy supply network
managed by an embedded control system.’ SMARTV2G comprises fea-
tures like EV load forecasting, estimation of vehicle to grid availability
and an optimal management of charging stations according to DSM
based on charging user preferences. Furthermore, the system offers
several services to the EV users like charging station booking, elec-
tric vehicle autonomy prediction, charging station finder and route
planning. The project consortium was comprised of partners from
several European countries, including from Spain, Slovenia, Italy, and
Germany. While the project lead to valuable results, no WTP for the
various services was estimated.
Comparably, Parsons et al. (2014) focus on V2G electric vehicles
and related contract terms. V2G electric vehicles can offer demand
response services by returning power stored in their batteries back
to the power grid at times when the grid needs reserve power and
by charging when there is a power oversupply. The authors are
among the few who investigate and quantify consumers’ WTP for
smart energy devices. The authors’ main question is whether con-
sumers embrace the idea of selling power to the power sector and,
if so, at what price. They conduct a discrete choice experiment with
3029 respondents to elicit valuations for V2G attributes such as the
required plug-in time and the guaranteed minimum driving range.
They do, however, not consider further services that could emerge
with V2G-EVs or other smart home devices more generally. Based
on a latent class random utility model they find that people place
high value on flexibility in their driving lifestyle. The authors sug-
gest two alternative strategies other than strict cash-back contracts
to foster EV sales: firstly, power aggregators could operate on a
pay-as-you-go basis without any contract requirements. Secondly,
power aggregators could compensate consumers with up-front cash
payments. Parsons et al. (2014) also refer to the possibility of a hybrid
approach where some customers sign contracts and others use pay-
as-you-go.We take these thoughts further, namely to energy services
4 The project was funded by the European Commission under the Seventh
Framework Programme.
that emerge with the smart devices, such as remote control, tech-
nical advice and data protection services, and also consider hybrid
contracting strategies.
3. Flexible mixed logit in WTP space with posterior analysis
The aim of this paper is to study how multiple consumer and
product attributes jointly affect service contract choices and to esti-
mate implicit prices not only for the bundled service, but also for its
components that could be combined to different contract portfolios.
Our estimation approach is based on the assumption of hetero-
geneity in preferences and valuations for smart electricity services
across consumers. Since consumers might also differ in their ran-
domness of choice, a model that can accommodate preference and
so-called scale heterogeneity is employed. Scale heterogeneitymight
result from heterogeneous experience with smart technology, which
mightmake less experienced consumers choosemore randomly than
consumers with experience or knowledge. We specify the model
in so-called WTP space. The distributional assumptions can then be
imposed directly on the WTPs and their moments estimated directly
from the data.5 Let the utility in WTP space be











where pjt measures the price of contract alternative j and vjt is a
(K × 1) vector of observable non-price attributes. ai and yi are
individual specific vectors of attribute coefficients to estimate. s i
can capture scale heterogeneity and (m1it,m2it) are random compo-
nents that follow a multivariate distribution to be specified by the
researcher and capture unobserved individual characteristics. In this
WTP space specification the idiosyncratic error follows a standard-
ised extreme value type I distribution Var(ijt) = p
2
6 , which allows
estimation as a mixed logit (MXL) model.
The scale parameter s i does not directly impact the WTPs, but
is picked up separately by ki, i.e. by the price coefficient in WTP
space. ki incorporates any differences in scale across respondents
(Train andWeeks, 2004).While the estimation in WTP space can yield
unconfounded WTP estimates, the price coefficient, ki, remains con-
founded by scale. Despite this lack of identification, we model the
scale parameter explicitly, following the model framework first pro-
posed by Keane and Wasi (2013) and operationalised by Fiebig et al.
(2010) and Hensher and Greene (2011): in their generalised multi-
nomial logit (GMNL) the scale parameter is modelled as si = exp(s¯+
t40,i) where 40,i follows an iid standard normal distribution such that
the parameter s i is log-normally distributed. A parameter t signif-
icantly different from zero indicates significant heterogeneity in s i.
This model is de facto a flexible mixed logit model in which the scale
and preference coefficients are modelled separately, can be hetero-
geneous and follow the distributions described above. We therefore
refer to the GMNL model as ‘heterogeneous scale mixed logit model’.
In addition, the heterogeneous scale mixed logit model in
WTP space allows for the derivation of individual conditional
distributions. Working with the conditional distributions allows us
to infer the likely position of each sampled individual on the distribu-
tion of valuations exploiting the information on their choices made.
Conditional distributions allow posterior analysis to be conducted
(Hess, 2010; Hess and Rose, 2012). We refer to ‘posterior analysis’ in
the sense that we explore the conditional estimates derived based
5 Any differences in model fit compared to models estimated on the same data in
preference space are mainly a result of the distributional assumptions imposed on the
parameters.
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on the individuals’ choices. The individual-level conditional mean, l i,
can be interpreted as the most likely value for a consumer i whose
choices yi were observed. The variance of the conditional means
across consumers (between variance) plus the variance around these
means (within variance) yields the total variance of valuations. If
the between variance captures a sufficiently large share of the total
variation, the individual conditional means and their variances have
the potential to be useful in distinguishing customers (Train, 2003).
While the estimation of the unconditional parameters can shed light
on the average valuations of services in the population, the condi-
tional estimates can provide more detailed insights on how electric-
ity service contracts, service fees in particular, should be designed
to incentivise the optimal number of customers to participate in the
service contracts in order to maximise the surplus of the platform
mediated two-sided electricity market.
4. Discrete choice experiment(DCE)
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on original data
from a stated choice experiment conducted onlinewith 1892 respon-
dents in Great Britain in 2015 to elicit customer valuations for smart
electricity service attributes and contracts.
Data from discrete choice experiments (DCE) can be exploited for
demand estimation and analysis, identify consumer segments char-
acterised by similar tastes and inform the design of products and
services to match consumer preferences (Akcura and Weeks, 2014).
The demand for electricity services depends on the service fees,
the service attributes and on socio-economic and demographic con-
sumer characteristics. Since smart electricity service contracts are
new to most customers, the number of attributes presented in the
DCE was restricted to those likely to determine the substitution pat-
terns between smart service contracts. The six attributes and their
levels were chosen based on previous consumer research on smart
homes and interviews conducted in the context of a pilot study. They
were refined further based on the pilot study results.
The six attributes were: (1) the monitoring of energy usage,
(2) the control of electricity usage, (3) technical support with set-up
and usage, (4) data privacy and security services, (5) expected elec-
tricity savings, and (6) a fee for the service bundle. We thus consider
so-called ‘shared savings contracts’, in which the expected savings in
the electricity bill are shared with the service company who enables
these savings. The monthly fee is paid to the service provider in
exchange for the service bundle that involves expected electricity
savings (besides other services). The electricity service attributes and
levels are summarised in Table 1 and explained inmore detail below.
Ahead of the DCE experiment, each respondent was providedwith
background information on smart energy services on screen and
with written and graphic explanations of all attributes and levels.
For all attributes and levels, hover-buttons were provided during the
experiment for the participants to refresh their knowledge about the
meaning of the different attributes and levels presented.
The respondents were asked to choose between three electricity
service contracts that differed in these six dimensions. Alternative
3 was a standard electricity contract without any smart services
and at zero additional cost or saving. We set all attribute lev-
els to the base level for this third alternative. When making their
choices, respondents were asked to assume that they were equipped
with all necessary smart devices to facilitate the contract chosen
at no additional cost, e.g. wireless internet connections, smart sen-
sors and remote controls. A questionnaire accompanying the choice
experiment included further questions on the customer such as
socio-economic characteristics, demographics, technology savviness
or previous experience. Table 2 shows an example choice card pre-
sented to the respondents. Each respondent was presented with
eight such cards, i.e., each respondent was asked to make eight
choices.
Table 1
Service attributes and levels.
Variable
Electricity usage monitoring
Level 1 (base) Electricity bill or prepayment
meter
Level 2 Real-time in-house monitor
with alerts in case of unusual
usage
monitor2
Level 3 Real-time monitoring &
personalised advice by service
provider
monitor3
Control of electrical devices
Level 1 (base) Manual control by household
Level 2 Remote & automated control by
household
control2




Level 1 (base) Initial 90 days basic technical
support
Level 2 On-going basic technical
support
support2
Level 3 On-going premium support
including personalised advice
support3
Data privacy & security
Level 1 (base) No data shared with third
parties
Level 2 Only electricity usage data
shared with third parties
privacy2
Level 3 Electricity usage & personally




5 levels 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% savings in
electricity bill (included as




5 levels 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%, 125% of
electricity bill savings (included
as actual cost levels, based on
status quo bill)
Fee
4.1. Service attributes and levels
4.1.1. Electricity usage monitoring
Understanding how much electricity is consumed and at what
cost is the starting point for any electricity bill saving. Traditionally,
households monitor their electricity usage and cost via their elec-
tricity bills or their prepayment meter. In-house monitors make it
possible to track electricity usage in real time. More advanced fea-
tures enable monitoring by device and alert messages at times of
excessive or unusual usage (e.g. via the bill payer’s mobile phone and
personal computer). Moreover, households can outsource the mon-
itoring to an electricity service provider. The consumer might per-
ceive the monitoring by a service company as valuable or intrusive,
rendering the sign of the impact on the consumer utility ambigu-
ous. The three types (i.e. levels) of usage monitoring included in the
discrete choice experiment are: (1) monitoring via the monthly elec-
tricity bill or prepayment meter, (2) real-time in-house monitoring
by the household with alerts in case of unusual usage, and (3) remote
monitoring by an electricity service provider who gives personalised
feedback based on the monitored data and exploits the information
for service design and load management.
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Table 2
Example choice card.
What would you choose? (Please choose one of these options)
Option A Option B Option C (Not Smart)




Electricity bill or prepayment meter
Control of devices Remote & automated control by
electricity service provider
Manual control by household Manual control by household
Technical support On-going basic technical support On-going premium support
including personalised advice
Initial 90days basic technical
support
Data privacy & security No data shared with third parties Usage & personally identifying
data shared with third parties
No data shared with third parties
Expected electricity 7.50 3.00 0.00
Bill Savings (£)
Monthly fee (£) 3.75 2.25 0.00
Preferred option (tick)
4.1.2. Control of electrical devices
Smart ICT makes it possible to control electrical devices remotely
or set them to work automatically based on pre-specified household
preferences. On the one hand, consumers might value any electricity
and carbon savings or increases in living comfort (e.g. from temper-
ature related control of heating). On the other hand, the household
might perceive remote control by a service company as intrusive
and might want to be compensated for giving up part of their con-
trol over their devices. The sign of the impact of the remote control
attribute levels on the consumer utility is thus ambiguous. In the
discrete choice experiment three types (i.e. levels) of control were
considered: (1) manual control by the household, (2) remote and
automated control by the household and (3) remote and automated
control by an electricity service provider.
4.1.3. Data privacy & security
The service attribute ‘data privacy and security’ refers to the
manner in which electricity usage data and personal data are
shared. Electricity companies have access to usage data and personal
information. With smart metering technologies, this data becomes
increasingly granular and can provide insights into consumer
behaviour and preferences. To enable advanced smart services, opti-
mize algorithms and deliver the optimal electricity management and
balancing services, the data may need to be shared with third par-
ties in order to be fully exploited to help tailoring advertisements to
specific customer segments and to help the balancing of the electric-
ity grid. Depending on whether the benefits of personalised services
outweigh the costs of a loss in privacy for an individual consumer, the
data sharing service can impact the utility positively or negatively.
The sign of the impact of the data privacy and security attribute lev-
els on the consumer utility is thus ambiguous. The three types (i.e.
levels) of data sharing services considered are: (1) no sharing of data
with any third party, (2) sharing of electricity usage data third par-
ties engaged in research, marketing or advertising and (3) sharing
of electricity usage data and personally identifying data (e.g. email
addresses) with third parties engaged in research, marketing or
advertising.
4.1.4. Technical support
Smart homes are an opportunity to offer technical expert support
services regarding the set-up and usage of smart devices. Those ser-
vices can be included in the service contract and priced based on the
type of support. Our hypothesis is that the respondents have a pos-
itive WTP for technical support. Three types (i.e. levels) of technical
support services are considered in the discrete choice experiment:
(1) basic support with set-up and usage of the devices for the initial
90days of the service contract, (2) ongoing basic support with set-up
and usage of the devices, and (3) ongoing technical premium sup-
port that includes set-up and usage of devices as well as customer
specific, personalised support.
4.1.5. Expected monthly electricity bill savings
We include the two attributes ‘expected electricity bill savings’
and ‘monthly fee’ separately, because the expected savings involve
uncertainty while the fee is paid with certainty. The willingness
to trade-off certain payments against uncertain savings can shed
light on consumers’ risk preferences and on whether consumers’
valuations go beyond the financial aspect of the savings. The ser-
vice attribute ‘expected monthly electricity bill savings’ refers to
the monthly electricity bill savings for the household. In the choice
experiment, the levels of expected savings are calculated as percent-
ages of the household’s current monthly electricity bill (0%, 5%, 10%,
15% and 20%). On the choice cards they were presented in monetary
terms (£ per month). The coefficient of this attribute indicates the
fees to expected savings ratio that consumers would accept. A posi-
tive WTP coefficient below 1 indicates that consumers are willing to
pay for expected bill savings as long as the expected savings exceed
the cost. The coefficient can also be seen as a measure of risk aver-
sion in the context of smart electricity services: a WTP below £1 per
£1 expected savings is consistent with risk aversion of the respon-
dent, a WTP equal to £1 is consistent with risk neutrality and a WTP
above £1 per expected £1 saving could indicate risk affinity. Under
the prior of risk averse respondents, a positive WTP smaller than £1
is hence expected.
4.1.6. Monthly fee
In the spirit of the shared savings contract, the fee levels consid-
ered in the experiment are defined in percentages of the expected
savings: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% and 125% of the expected monthly
electricity savings. However, in the experiment we present the abso-
lute cost level in terms of GBP per month. The actual levels are status
quo specific and calculated based on the reportedmonthly electricity
bill. In most cases, the monthly fee is thus lower than the bill savings,
but there are also contract options which involve a net financial cost
for the customer.
As an example, a respondent with monthly electricity bill of £50
would be presented with options to save 0, 5, 10, 15, or 20% of his
electricity bill. In the case of 10% savings, for example, the respondent
would be presented with savings of £5 on the choice card. Depend-
ing on the contract shown, the monthly fee associated with these
expected savings would then be a multiple of this savings amount,
i.e. range from no fee (corresponding to 0% of the savings), over a fee
of £1.25 (25% of the savings), £2.50 (50% of the savings), £3.75 (75%
of the savings) to a maximum fee of £6.25 (corresponding to 125% of
the expected savings).
442 L-L. Richter, M. Pollitt / Energy Economics 72 (2018) 436–450
4.2. Experimental design
In our experiment, the attributes and levels selected for the
study were combined into profiles and the profiles combined into
sequences of choice situations according to a D-efficient experimen-
tal design.6 This design approach uses a search algorithm to find as
statistically efficient a design as possible given prior values for the
ultimate model to be estimated.
Various restrictions were placed on the design in order to pre-
vent dominant and dominated alternatives within a choice situation,
and to avoid combinations of attributes that were considered
implausible. These included the following: more monitoring and
control must lead to higher cost savings; remote and automated
control required a smart monitor; and that better service should
always imply a more expensive package. The design was segmented
into 12 blocks, with 8 choices per block. The target measure of effi-
ciency was the D-error, calibrated on the basis of an MNL model
containingmarginal utilities whichwere derived from analysis of the
pilot data for the study. Sign-based priors only were used for the
pilot study itself. A swapping algorithm (Huber and Zwerina, 1996)
was implemented within the Ngene software package to obtain the
experimental design that was ultimately adopted. In this design, lev-
els were approximately, although not exactly, balanced across the
design. The final discrete choice experiment consisted of a panel
of eight choices for each respondent. Each choice card consisted
of two experimentally designed unlabeled alternatives and a base
alternative that implied zero change in cost for the consumer.
5. Data
The discrete choice experiment was conducted with a repre-
sentative sample of 1892 customers in Great Britain.7 About 79%
of the respondents were customers of one of the big six electric-
ity suppliers. The remaining 21% of respondents were customers
of smaller companies. Many of these have potential to offer smart
electricity services in the future. When asked for the preferred
contractor for a smart electricity service, almost 50% of the respon-
dents considered one of the big six energy suppliers. About 14%
would opt for a contract with a specialist electricity management
company. Only about 10% of the respondents had bought or been
given any smart devices in the last two years. The most common
smart device among this group is an in-house monitor. Other smart
devices mentioned are smart lighting, programmable thermostats,
smart plugs and household appliances. The respondents without any
smart appliances reported that they perceive the smart appliances as
too expensive (28%), that they are not necessary (28%) and that they
are difficult to understand (20%). Moreover, 17% of the respondents
who did not have any smart appliances considered the impact on the
electricity bill as too small, 14% did not knowwhere to buy the appli-
ances and 12% reported that they do not buy any smart appliances
due to privacy concerns. When prompted more directly whether
remote control was associated with any concerns, almost half of the
sample indicated concerns regarding remote controlled appliances.
Privacy concerns were regarded as the most common concern (21%).
Other concerns included damage to the appliances, lack of flexibil-
ity in use and the accessibility of appliances when needed and the
required behaviour change. Further data was collected related to the
energy and electricity consumption of the respondents.
6 Thanks to Paul Metcalfe from PJM Economics, who designed the experiment and
provided this summary of the experimental design.
7 Thanks to Paul Metcalfe from PJM Economics, who designed the experiment and
provided this summary of the experimental design, and to Accent for conducting the
experiment.
Table 3 summarises age, professions and the annual income as
reported by the respondents. Categorizing the professions into three
socio-economic groups (SEGs), 25% of the sample are in the econom-
ically most prosperous group (SEG AB), 51% in the economic upper
and lower middle class (SEG C1/C2), and 23% are relatively deprived
(SEG DE). Table 4 summarises further statistics on dwelling type,
ownership and household size.
6. Model specification and WTP space results
In our empirical specification, we use dummy variables to indi-
cate the levels of the service attributesmonitoring, control, technology
support and data privacy & security. Level 1 of each attribute serves
as the base level. For the third alternative, all levels are set equal to
this base level. The fee and expected electricity bill savings attributes
are included as a continuous monetary variable. We include an alter-
native specific constant (ASC3) for the third alternative. A positive
coefficient of this ASC indicates a preference to choose the stan-
dard contract, regardless of the levels of the service attributes.8 The
equation for the expected utility in preference space is given as:




where feejt is the monthly service fee (£) and monitor2jt, . . . ,
Esavingsjt are the variables capturing the attribute levels as described
in Table 1. As mentioned above, the cost and savings variables are
included as actual cost and savings levels in monetary terms. ai,
yASC3jit andy1i, . . . ,y9i are the attribute level coefficients to estimate.
While the estimation of the unconditional hyper-parameters can
shed light on the average valuations of services in the population,
conditional distributions allow to infer the likely position of each
sampled individual on the distribution of sensitivities or valuations,
exploiting the information on their choices made. The conditional
distributions can be exploited to explore the heterogeneity in
valuations. They can provide more detailed insights how electric-
ity service contracts, service fees in particular, should be designed
to incentivise the optimal number of customers to participate in the
service contracts andmaximise the surplus of the platformmediated
two-sided electricity market.
Table 5 lists the summary statistics for the individual posterior
mean valuations (A) and the posterior standard deviations (B), both
derived from the heterogeneous scale mixed logit model in WTP
space. Columns (C) and (D) summarise the corresponding individ-
ual posterior minimum and maximum mean evaluations. Columns
(E) and (F) list the estimated hyper-parameters, i.e. prior means and
standard deviations (lˆprior and sˆprior). The full table of the uncondi-
tional estimates can be found in Table K.1 in Appendix A.
The estimated unconditional means (column E) suggest that con-
sumers have a positive, but not statistically significant WTP for smart
monitoring via an in-house monitor that indicates consumption in
real time and sends alerts in case of unusual usage (monitor2). They
do, however, want significant compensation for being monitored
remotely by an electricity service provider. Their WTA is on average
8 Given the zero cost change implied by the third alternative, one might expect
some consumer inertia towards this alternative 3 simply because it did not imply
any additional cost rather than due to a real preference for the standard electricity
contract. From our analysis, it is not possible to determine whether the choices of
this alternative reflects a true preference for the standard contract or whether the
alternative was chosen merely because it did not imply any additional costs for the
respondent.
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Table 3
Socio-economic statistics.
Age Profession Annual income
18 to 24 3% Senior managerial or professional 2% Up to £15,600 27%
25 to 34 11% Intermediate managerial, administrative or professional 11% 15,601 to £52,000 56%
35 to 49 17% Supervisor; clerical; jr. managerial, admin. or professional 24% £52,001+ 8%
50 to 64 37% Manual worker (with industry qualif) 13% Prefer not to say 9%
65 to 74 26% Manual worker (with no qualif) 7%
75 + 5% Unemployed 8%
Retired 33%
Student 1%
Prefer not to say 1%
Total 100% 100% 100%
(1892) (1892) (1892)
£0.55 per month (monitor3). The valuations for smart control are
comparable: while the valuation of smart remote control by the
household is insignificant, the average WTA smart remote and auto-
mated control by the service provider is about £1.64 per month
(control3). On the other hand, consumers value technical support:
they would pay about £0.45 per month for ongoing technical sup-
port (support2) with set-up and usage of the devices and £0.48
per month, if the service included personalised feedback (support3).
The valuations of usage and personally identifying data are also
significant. To accept the provision of real-time usage data to third
parties, customers would ask for a compensation of about £1 per
month (privacy2). To also share personally identifying data, the com-
pensation would need to be three times as high: on average £3.17
per month. Finally, per expected pound of bill saving, the customer
would be willing to pay about £0.33, which is consistent with an
assumption of risk averse consumers, who are only willing to pay for
expected savings if the ratio of fee to expected savings is relatively
low.
The significant unconditional standard deviations (column F in
Table 5), imply substantial variation of valuations across respon-
dents. Such heterogeneity can be exploited for differentiated con-
tracting.
Finally, column (G) in Table 5 lists the ratio of the posterior
standard deviations to the total standard deviations (sˆli /sˆprior).
9
For the attributes remote control by the service provider, data pri-
vacy and electricity bill savings the variation of the posterior means
makes up over 50% of the total variation in mean valuations. Almost
73% of the variation in WTPs for expected electricity bill savings for
example is due to variation between (rather than within) individu-
als. Since the variation of the individual conditional means (i.e. the
variation between individuals) captures a large share of the total esti-
mated variation in that coefficient, they have potential to be useful
in distinguishing customers (Train, 2003). This can be valuable for
targeting contract designs on particular customers.
6.1. Investigating the sources of preference heterogeneity
The estimated model reveals significant heterogeneity in
valuations. However, the random parameter models abstracts
from the sources of heterogeneity, but capture it entirely in the
Table 4
Dwelling, ownership and household size.




1 person household 25%
2 persons household 48%
3 persons household 14%
4+ persons household 14%
random parameters. To shed light on the drivers of the revealed
heterogeneity, we also test models with interactions of attribute and
respondent characteristics. A major challenge and drawback of such
models is the difficulty to select the appropriate interactions and the
increased complexity of the model as the number of included vari-
ables increases. However, simple MNL models with interaction terms
of attribute and respondent characteristics can provide first insights
into the drivers of heterogeneity in valuations.
We test various model specifications with interaction terms of
attribute and respondent characteristics. Of particular interest are
the interactions of the fee (i.e. price) variable with the income vari-
able. These can reveal whether significant income effects are present.
Table K.2 in Appendix A lists the results of the MNL model with
the fee-income interactions, illustrating the heterogeneity in price
sensitivities. Most remarkably, the fee-income interactions reveal
significant but very small coefficients indicating that the price sen-
sitivity of high income consumers (income higher than £52,000 per
annum) is lower than for respondents with lower income. For the
WTP this implies ceteris paribus larger WTP and lower WTA for these
highest income consumers. Consumers with low and medium high
income do not differ significantly in their price sensitivities.
We also test MNL models with interactions of the attribute vari-
ables with the following respondent specific characteristics: age,
technology savviness and socio-economic group. This reveals that
the fee sensitivity increases the less technology savvy, the older the
respondent and the lower the socio-economic status.10
For the younger respondents between 18 and 35, we estimate
a significantly higher willingness to pay for smart energy services
than for older respondents between 35 and 75. The differences in
valuations across the different socio-economic groups turned out
not significant. Moreover, the results suggest that less technology-
savvy respondents have a significantly lower willingness to pay than
the more tech-savvy respondents. To measure respondent’s technol-
ogy savviness, we exploit the responses to the question worded as
‘Which of the following best describes your typical reaction to new
technologies?’. Four categories of technology savviness were consid-
ered (using a Likert Scale). Category 1 ‘Always eager to try new ideas
and products regardless of what others say’ had the highest willing-
ness to pay. Table 6 shows the percentage share of the different types
in the sample.
7. Implications for electricity service contracts
Traditionally, settlement for domestic customers was performed
using so-called electricity load ‘profiling’ based on a small sample
of the population and the rest of the population was assumed to
have similar profiles (McKenna et al., 2012). The availability of smart
10 The full estimation results are available upon request of the authors.
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Table 5
Summary statistics individual posterior means (GMNL-II).
Posterior (Conditional) Priori (Unconditional)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)%
Variable lˆli sˆli min lˆi max lˆi lˆprior sˆprior (sˆli/sˆprior)
monitor2 0.14 0.50 −2.71 2.73 0.13 1.036∗∗∗ 48.40%
monitor3 −0.55 0.03 −0.73 −0.38 −0.55∗∗∗ 0.0787 44.45%
control2 −0.04 0.22 −1.36 1.16 −0.04 0.493∗∗ 45.55%
control3 −1.65 0.64 −4.57 1.70 −1.64∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗ 51.02%
support2 0.45 0.14 −0.17 1.02 0.45∗∗∗ 0.294* 47.00%
support3 0.48 0.04 0.27 0.70 0.48∗∗∗ 0.0807 46.48%
privacy2 −1.01 0.65 −4.04 1.77 −1.00∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 50.22%
privacy3 −3.17 1.84 −10.81 5.64 −3.11∗∗∗ 2.923∗∗∗ 62.85%
E(Bill Savings) (£) 0.33 0.49 −1.40 2.18 0.34∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 72.72%
∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
meter data is expected to facilitate more customer specific load
profiling and hence contract differentiation.
However, to optimally exploit the heterogeneous electricity load
profiles for DSM, consumers have to be willing to accept new types of
monitoring, control and pricing. Not only the heterogeneity in load
profiles, but also the heterogeneity in the demand flexibility does
hence become decisive for pricing strategies. Consumers who are not
willing to adopt the new technologies offer less potential for DSM. For
electricity service providers, an understanding of the heterogeneity
in valuations for different service attributes offers hence additional
potential for consumer targeted contracting and pricing. The chal-
lenge lies in the optimal design of the platform fee to facilitate
optimal management of flexible demand.
Our results suggest thatmost consumers are likely to ask for com-
pensation to participate in smart electricity service contracts that
involve remote and automatedmonitoring and control by the service
Table 6
Technology types.
Technology type % Share
Always eager to try new ideas and products, regardless of
what others say
13
Keen to try out new products early on if some positive
reviews heard
39
Decision after most of friends and usually rely on the views
of others
33




Mean fixed tariffs for several service bundles combining remote monitoring & control
with further services.
Service bundle WTP (£per month)
Remote monitoring & control ONLY −2.19
Remote monitoring & control PLUS
+ usage data sharing −3.19
+ usage and personally identifying data sharing −5.30
+ ongoing support −1.74
+ premium support −1.71
+ ongoing support & usage data sharing −2.74
+ ongoing support & usage and personal data sharing −4.85
+ premium support & usage data sharing −2.71
+ premium support & usage and personal data sharing −4.82
Table 7 lists the average fixed WTP for the different contracts. Since the WTP is
negative, this corresponds to the compensation consumers would need to be paid
per month when signing up for smart service contracts that bundle multiple ser-
vice attributes together. The mean compensations were calculated as the sum of
the respective mean attribute valuations. As an example, the mean compensation to
be paid for a contract that combines remote monitoring and control by the service
provider would need to be £2.19.
provider. Following the more general results regarding pricing on
platform markets of Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Economides and
Katsamakas (2006), we propose that a mixture of fixed and transac-
tion based payment to the consumers could incentivise them to sign
up for the platform service contracts. The fixed payment could con-
sist of a monthly compensation for remote monitoring and control
by the service provider (e.g. the mean WTA).11 It could be supple-
mented with charges for technical support and/or compensations for
data sharing.
Table 7 lists the average (fixed) WTP for different smart service
bundles. A negative WTP corresponds to the compensation house-
holds would on average need to be paid per month for accepting
the different smart service bundles. The tariffs shown in Table 7
are differentiated by service, but not by consumer type. They were
calculated as the sum of the respective mean attribute valuations
listed in Table 5. As an example, the mean compensation to be
paid for a contract that combines remote monitoring and control
by the service provider would need to be £2.19 per month (i.e.
£1.64+£0.55=£2.19). The highest average compensation would
need to be paid for customerswho sign up for remotemonitoring and
control, do not want any technical support beyond the basic support,
but are willing to share usage and personally identifying data against
compensation (£5.30 per month). The lowest average compensation
is needed in case of contracts that involve premium support but no
sharing of any data usage or personally identifying data (£1.71 per
month). By keeping consumer data private and secure, the compen-
sation required to acquire consumers can hence be reduced. Fig. 1
illustrates the composition of the considered fixed tariffs.
Beyond the fixed part of the platform fee, a transaction based fee
could be paid for each £1 that the service provider expects to save in
the monthly electricity bill. The DCE yields the WTP for the expected
bill savings regardless of any other service contract attributes: con-
sumers are willing to pay on average about 34% of the amount they
expect to save in their bills.
So far, we considered the mean compensation required for accep-
tance of different service bundles combining remote monitoring
and control with distinct other services. Given the significant het-
erogeneity in valuations for most service attributes, there is scope
for further contract differentiation, namely based on consumer
characteristics. This can be efficient since the electricity service mar-
ket does not need full market penetration.12 In fact, some consumers
will be more valuable than others in terms of providing demand
response. Given the costs of customer acquisition, the more valuable
11 The compensation paid for remote monitoring and control and for data sharing
could also be individual specific, since we find significant heterogeneity in valuations.
12 The optimal level of platform adoption by consumers remains to be determined
and is not in the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 1. Composition of fixed monthly tariffs for various service bundles combining remote monitoring & control with further services. The figure illustrates the contribution
of different service components to compensation payments. Since consumer value technical support services, they can decrease the cross-subsidies required for participation.
Data-sharing on the other hand comes along with higher required mean compensation.
consumers should be targeted first. In practice, households that are
willing to give up more control to the platform to shift, interrupt or
reduce their energy consumption, offer higher potential for volatil-
ity reduction and efficiency gains. They should be compensated
proportionally (Weiller and Pollitt, 2013). Moreover, the significant
heterogeneity in WTP for data sharing and expected savings offer
potential for consumer differentiation.
To inform the design of consumer targeted contract menus we
perform posterior analysis and distinguish two types of posterior
analysis: 1) posterior analysis of the conditional mean valuations and
their variation across customers (between variance) and 2) poste-
rior analysis of individual specific valuation profiles and the variation
around the individual mean (within variance). Small niche service
providers for example might want to attract customers whose pref-
erences for electricity contracts are quite different from those of
the other customer clusters. Under these circumstances, individual
consumer specific contract design might be viable and valuable.
Our findings support the Competition Market Authority’s (CMA)
critique regarding the restrictions on the number of tariffs offered
by suppliers in the UK (Competition and Markets Authority (CMA),
2016). In the final report to the energy market investigation in 2016,
the CMA recommends the elimination of restrictions on the number
of tariffs, especially in the context of smart meter roll-out. This is in
line with our findings that an efficient implementation and usage of
smart energy services requires customized contractual agreements.
7.1. Posterior analysis of conditional mean valuations
We perform two types of posterior analysis of conditional mean
valuations: first, we test for mean differences in individual level
posterior mean valuations across different covariate categories such
as income and age categories. Second, we cluster the posterior
valuations using a k-means algorithm and test mean differences in
individual mean valuations and in respondent characteristics across
these clusters.
First, when testingmean differences in valuations across different
covariate categories, we find that high income respondents have sig-
nificantly higher valuations for smart monitoring and smart energy
savings than low and medium income respondents. The valuations
for the other attributes do not differ across income categories. These
findings are consistent with the estimates resulting from model
specifications with the respective covariate-attribute interactions. In
a simple MNL specification in preference space, for example, the coef-
ficient of the fee-income interactions are significant and result in
higher valuations for higher income consumer categories for some of
the attributes (see Section 6.1).
Second, to illustrate how the posteriormeans can be used to iden-
tify and characterise customer segments in the population, we group
the observations using k-means clustering on the nine posterior val-
uations for the service attributes into segments of respondents (fol-
lowing Train, 2003).13 Such clustering can shed light on the groups
of customers that would accept contracts with similar characteris-
tics. Respondents within one cluster are hence similar in multiple
valuation dimensions. Across the four clusters significant mean dif-
ferences in valuations for remote control by the service provider
(control3), in the WTP for sharing of usage and personally identifying
data (privacy3), and in the WTP for expected electricity bill savings
(Esavings) are found.
13 Several numbers of clusters k were tested. Starting from k = 2, the number of
clusters in the population was increased until significant mean differences in valu-
ations were found that could be exploited for segment specific contract design and
price discrimination. This was the case for k = 4.
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Table 8
Valuations (£per month) and background characteristics by customer clusters.
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Observations 602 278 750 262
control3 −1.59 −1.62 −1.72 −1.58
privacy3 −2.29 −5.90 −3.93 −0.07
E(Bill Savings) (£) 0.35 0.44 0.24 0.41
Age 4.87 4.85 4.95 4.74
Female 54% 63% 57% 51%
SEG DE 24% 23% 26% 37%
Occupants 2.21 2.19 2.07 2.35
PAG tariff 17% 15% 14% 20%
Technology type 2.49 2.55 2.72 2.33
Concerns remote control 41% 53% 51% 39%
Above avge choice confidence 50% 53% 52% 37%
Above avge understanding of DCE 39% 38% 40% 31%
Above avge perception of realism 67% 68% 59% 66%
Cluster name Unremarkable Private data Risk averse Open data
Table 8 summarises these mean valuations for each cluster.14 In
particular, the mean compensation asked for sharing usage and per-
sonally identifying data varies remarkably from a low mean WTA of
−£0.07 in cluster 4 to amean valuation of−£5.90 in cluster 3. Service
providers should thus ensure careful treatment of the consumers’
data when targeting cluster 2, while they could exploit the potential
to use consumer data for service improvements at relatively low cost
based on cluster 4. The mean WTP for expected electricity bill sav-
ings varies from £0.25 per £1 expected savings per month in cluster
3 to £0.44 per £1 expected savings per month in cluster 2. However,
in all clusters the desired shared savings contracts should at least
offer expected bill savings that are more than twice as high than
the fee, i.e. in all clusters the mean fee to expected savings ratio is
below 0.5.
Based on these findings cluster 2 can be considered as a cluster
of respondents that particularly value their data privacy. Cluster 3 is
characterised by particularly risk averse respondents and Cluster 4
does not call for significant compensation to share data. We label the
clusters based on the outcomes: ‘Unremarkable’ (cluster 1), ‘Private
data’ (cluster 2), ‘Risk averse’ (cluster 3) and ‘Open Data’ (cluster 4).
Table 8 also summarises respondent characteristics of the clus-
ters. Tests of mean differences in these characteristics across the
clusters indicate significant differences in the average age, the share
of females, the share of deprived households and the number of occu-
pants in the household as well as in the share of households that is
on a pay as you go tariff: Cluster 2 (private data) has a significantly
higher share of females (63 %) than the other clusters. Respondents
on this cluster also report concerns regarding remote control, which
is consistent with their valuations of data privacy. Cluster 3 (risk
averse) has a relatively high share of technology averse respondents,
which is consistent with the fact that these respondents are on aver-
age more risk averse (they require relatively high expected savings
for any given fee). The cluster of on average risk averse respondents
(cluster 3) also has on the oldest customer base. Cluster 4 (open data)
has a relatively small share of females (51%) and a high share of
deprived respondents (37%). Related to this, a relatively large share
of respondents is on PAG tariffs. Respondents in this cluster are less
concerned about data privacy. That the share of people with con-
cerns regarding remote control is relatively low in cluster 4 (the open
data segment), is also intuitive. Lastly, cluster 4 has a significantly
lower share of respondents who indicate above average confidence
and understanding of the choices.
14 Age categories: 1 = 18 to 24, 2 = 25 to 34, 3 = 35 to 49, 4 = 50 to 64, 5 = 65 to
74.
To shed light on the acceptance rate for certain contract types,
we exploit the distribution of the individual conditional estimates,
assuming normality. Table 9 summarises the mean subscription fees
required to achieve acceptance rate of 1, 50, 75 and 99% in the
population and in the four identified clusters.15 Negative subscrip-
tion fees imply a demand for compensation by the consumers. They
were calculated based on the conditional mean valuations within the
population and within the four clusters.
Consider the basic platform service contract that just involves
remote monitoring and control by a service provider (Table 9, top).
About 45% of all customers would be willing to accept such a con-
tract, if they receive a mean compensation of approximately £2.20
per month. A compensation of £3.83 would achieve a 99% adop-
tion rate. The compensations required are comparable across the
four clusters (recall that the most remarkable differences in valua-
tions were discovered in the valuations for data privacy services).
Depending on the required number of customers for optimal local
grid balancing, service providers and suppliers could negotiate the
compensation to be paid and the degree of customer differentiation.
Considering a contract that involves remote monitoring and con-
trol plus usage and personally identifying data sharing illustrates
how the cluster analysis can be exploited to shed light on potential
customer targeted contracts (Table 9, bottom). The service provider
would need to offer a compensation of £9.82 to achieve acceptance of
99% in the population. 75% would accept, if they were offered a com-
pensation of about £6.62. For this service contract bundle, involving
more extensive data sharing, the required compensations to achieve
a specific percentage of acceptance vary significantly across clusters.
The compensation required to attract consumers in cluster 2
(‘Private data’) is remarkably high, for example: for the acceptance
of 99, 75 or 1% of the customers £11, £8.65 or £5.86 need to be
paid, respectively. These compensations are significantly higher than
those required to attract similar percentages of consumers in clus-
ter 4 (‘Open data’). To achieve an acceptance rate of 99 or 75% of the
‘open data’ cluster, only £4.50 or £3.05 need to be paid, respectively.
More than 5% of the ‘Open data’ customers are willing to pay for such
a contract that combines remote monitoring and control with data
sharing. From the service provider’s point of view, this cluster could
hence be targeted first.
15 The optimal level of platform adoption by consumers remains to be determined
and is not in the scope of this paper.
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Table 9
Fixed subscription fees (£) required to achieve acceptance rates of 1%, 50%, 75%, and 99%.
Acceptance rate All Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Customary Private data Risk averse Open data
Remote monitoring & control
1% −0.50 −0.50 −0.04 −0.78 −0.08
50% −2.23 −2.20 −2.22 −2.29 −2.18
75% −2.55 −2.50 −2.61 −2.56 −2.60
99% −3.83 −3.82 −3.87 −3.85 3.72
Remote monitoring & control PLUS sharing of usage & personally identifying data
1% 0.01 −2.41 −5.86 −4.60 2.04
50% −5.52 −4.51 −7.86 −6.16 −2.46
75% −6.62 −5 −8.65 −6.67 −3.06
99% −9.82 −6.20 −11 −7.82 −4.51
Table 10
Acceptance rates for exemplary contracts combining fixed compensation & transaction based component.
All Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Customary Private data Risk averse Open data
−£2.19 + £0.50 per exp. £1 saving 20% 21% 27% 13% 27%
−£2.19 + £0.33 per exp. £1 saving 24% 26% 33% 16% 34%
−£4 + £0.50 per exp. £1 saving 35% 36% 49% 26% 44%
−£4 + £0.33 per exp. £1 saving 46% 48% 60% 36% 59%
Now consider combinations of fixed and transaction based pric-
ing components. Table 10 summarises the acceptance rate for
example contracts that combine a fixed compensation payment with
a transaction based component, namely a payment per £1 saved in
the electricity bill. The acceptance rates within the different clusters
are listed.
As expected, the acceptance rate ceteris paribus decreases the
lower the fixed subsidy and the higher the fee to expected savings
ratio (i.e. the lower the share of the savings being granted to the cus-
tomer is). Offering the average required compensation for remote
monitoring and control, i.e. £2.19 and the average required fee to
savings ratio of 0.33 would attract about 24% of all customers, for
example. A higher fixed monthly compensation can partly make up
for higher fee to expected savings ratios: with a highermonthly com-
pensation of £4, for example, and a fee to expected savings ratio of
0.33, around 46% of the customers would accept the contract.16
Depending on the bargaining power of the service provider,
the heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to share savings could
hence be exploited to increase the fixed compensation in exchange
for a lower share of savings for those who are relatively risk averse,
for example. However, if the transaction based payment exceeds the
monetary amount expected to be saved (i.e. the fee to expected sav-
ings ratio is larger than 1), only 9% of customers would accept (even
if the compensation was much higher). Hence, even very high com-
pensations do not incentivise consumers to participate, if they do
not receive a relatively high share of the expected bill savings. In
all examples, acceptance rates are lowest for the risk averse cluster,
indicating their relative reluctance to engage with smart electricity
services.
Our results suggest, that, where economically and technically
feasible, energy services companies should provide targeted, cus-
tomer specific services to achieve smart and efficient outcomes.
16 Sincewe are exploiting the individual posterior distributions, we areworkingwith
the posterior mean valuations here.
Vulnerable customers could be protected by a separate contractual
schedule determined by the regulator.
7.2. Posterior analysis of individual specific valuation profiles
The individual level posterior mean valuations also provide
insights into the peculiarities of individual preferences and can
inform individual customer specific contract design. We present
the mean valuations for an example respondent and discuss poten-
tial customer specific contract features that could incentivise this
particular consumer to participate in the smart services platform
market. Such specific contract design is most likely to occur for
niche service providers who might want to attract customers whose
preferences for electricity contracts are quite different from most
others.
Table K.3 in Appendix A summarises the estimated posterior val-
uations for an exemplary respondent. The respondent was identified
based on his valuations for the services, which indicate his open-
ness towards smart electricity services and his WTP for them. The
respondent is willing to spend £0.72 for being able to remotely mon-
itor his usage, but prefers monitoring by himself over outsourcing
the monitoring. He would also pay about £0.50 for technical support.
Finally, his need for compensation to share his data seems relatively
low and he is willing to pay £1.28 for each £1 saving in the elec-
tricity bill. This high WTP for savings in the electricity bill might be
due to a perceived and valued environmental benefit on top of the
monetary bill savings. The respondent’s mean confidence regarding
the choices made is fairly high and his understanding and his per-
ceived realism of the tasks as measured on a four point Likert scale
are also above average. His choice behaviour and valuations are con-
sistent with his background characteristics and qualitative survey
responses: the respondent considers himself as technology friendly
and does not have any concerns regarding the remote control of his
appliances. He is one of the few respondents who own a solar PV
panel and smart appliances. His current electricity supplier is EDF
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Energy where he has signed up for an Economy 7 tariff, a time-
varying tariff. His annual electricity bill lies with £750 (£62.50 per
month) slightly above average. The respondent lives on his own in
an urban area in England in a semi-detached house. Being between
64 and 75years old, he is retired and belongs to the rather socially
deprived social class DE. His annual income lies between £15,000 and
£52,000 per year. Overall, this respondent seems to be a technology
savvy environmentally conscious consumer, who is already familiar
with smart and energy efficient technologies. His survey responses
and stated preferences and valuations indicate that he is a potential
customer of smart electricity services.
Based on the estimated within variance, the likelihood that an
individual’s valuation lies in a specific range can be calculated (e.g. a
largewithin variation can imply a higher probability of sign reversal).
The within variance can measure the precision with which the indi-
vidual mean valuation is estimated and hence indicate the precision
with which a contract is targeted at a specific customer i.
For each contract feature we can identify the probability of sign
reversal for the customer. With a probability of at least 70% the
presented consumer rejects a contract in which he is asked to pay
for remote monitoring and control. However, based on his average
valuations he could be offered a contract that combines a £1.05 com-
pensation payment with a charge of £0.50 for the premium support
and a fee to savings ratio that is relatively high, namely 1.28. Such a
customer hence needs relatively low compensation to participate in
the smart service platform.
8. Limitations and suggestions for further research
One limitation of this research is that it is based on hypothetical
and hence stated choices of service contracts for which the market is
still emerging. Some randomness of choice on the decision maker’s
side is therefore likely. In fact, we expect the randomness of choice
to be heterogeneous across respondents: some consumers might
have more experience with related ICT and thus likely to choose less
randomly than others without this experience. To account for such
heterogeneity in the randomness of choice, a heterogeneous scale
parameter is included in the model. However, the scale parameter
is not separately identified from the price parameter. If researchers
are interested in the causes of scale heterogeneity, our model is not
informative.
To address part of this issue, three types of questions, designed
to shed light on the randomness of choice, were linked to the DCE:
(1) after each of the eight choice tasks the respondents reported
their level of choice confidence; and after the choice experiment the
respondents reported (2) their understanding of the choice task and
(3) their perceived realism. The responses were based on a five point
Likert scale (e.g. 1 — very confident, 2 — fairly confident, 3 — neither
confident nor unconfident, 4 — fairly unconfident, 5 — very uncon-
fident). According to the stated measures, most respondents were
fairly confident about their choices, understood the tasks well and
perceived the experiment as realistic: the average confidence level
across respondents was 1.93, the average understanding of the DCE
as reported on the five point Likert scale was 1.8 and the average
perceived realism was 2.3. Based on these reported measures the
heterogeneity of choice does not seem very pronounced.
However, the reported measures of confidence, understanding
and perceived realism are likely to suffer from measurement error,
which will bias the estimates. Hess and Stathopoulos (2013) argue
that linking scale heterogeneity to measured characteristics is likely
to give limited insights, while using respondent reported measures
of the randomness of choice implies a risk of measurement error
and endogeneity bias. Hess suggests a hybrid model in which survey
engagement is treated as a latent variable tomodel the values of indi-
cators of survey engagement in a measurement model component,
as well as explaining scale heterogeneity within the choice model.
This links part of the heterogeneity across respondents to differences
in scale. Since our questions on choice confidence, understanding
and perceived realism are comparable to those discussed by Hess
and Stathopoulos (2013), researchers who aim to focus on a more
detailed analysis of the randomness of choice could extend our
research in this or similar directions. To accommodate heterogeneity
in the randomness of choice, future work could also exploit our data
to model the choices directly based on an assumption of stochastic
preferences.
Another noteworthy limitation of this research regard so-called
‘packaging effects’. Such effects imply that, for the consumer, the sum
of the attribute valuations is not equal to the value of the bundle
of such attributes. If this is the case, adjustment factors should be
derived and applied to the estimates to scale them appropriately.
9. Conclusion
The value of the domestic consumer as a grid resource is at the
heart of the transition to a platform market in residential electric-
ity services. This paper illustrates how this value can be exploited
via contract design that takes consumer heterogeneity flexibly into
account. We analyse how consumers value smart electricity services
and which electricity service contract terms they would accept.
The demand analysis is based on a stated choice experiment con-
ducted with 1892 electricity consumers in Great Britain in 2015,
shedding light on the key attributes that drive demand for smart
electricity services. The statistical modelling takes different types
of heterogeneity into account: a flexible mixed logit model in WTP
space is combined with posterior analysis to elicit consumer prefer-
ences and heterogeneity in valuations for smart electricity services.
In practice, households that are willing to give up more control
to service providers to shift, interrupt or reduce their energy con-
sumption offer higher potential for volatility reduction and efficiency
gains. We suggest possible pricing strategies that could incentivise
contract adoption by the number of customers required to provide
the optimal level of demand response.
We find that consumers demand statistically significant com-
pensation to accept remote monitoring and control by a service
provider. The most remarkable contract differentiation potential has
been revealed to lie in the data services: the compensation needed
to accept the sharing of usage and personal data is significant,
but varies substantially across the identified customer clusters.
The smart electricity platform service provider should hence con-
sider carefully which customer segments to target regarding data
sharing. By contrast, the results suggest that consumers value tech-
nical support relatively homogeneously and would be willing to pay
for it.
The significant heterogeneity in valuations for most of the con-
sidered contract attributes suggests that customer profiling based on
posterior analysis could inform contract design. A mixture of fixed
and transaction based payment to the consumers could promote
the acceptance of smart electricity services contracts. A possibly
consumer segment specific fixed monthly compensation for remote
monitoring and control by the service provider could be supple-
mented by charges for technical support and data privacy services,
depending on the consumer’s preferences. The transaction based
payment could be based on the expected electricity bill savings.
When considering the trade-off between fixed compensation
payment and the fees to savings ratio, we find that even very
high fixed monthly compensations do not incentivise consumers
to participate, unless they receive a relatively high share of the
expected bill savings.
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We also illustrate that while customer group profiles can inform
the design of contract menus, individual profiles can inform cus-
tomer specific contracts. Small niche service providers for example
might want to attract customers whose preferences for electric-
ity contracts are quite different from those of the other customer
clusters.
Our findings support the Competition Market Authority’s (CMA)
critique of restrictions on the number of tariffs offered by suppliers
in the UK (Competition andMarkets Authority (CMA), 2016). The CMA
recommends the elimination of restrictions on the number of tariffs
especially in the context of smart meter roll-out. This is in line with
our findings that an efficient implementation and usage of smart
energy services requires customized contractual agreements.
Since the demand model does not separately identify the scale
parameter, further research could exploit the survey responses on
choice confidence, understanding and realism to explore the hetero-
geneity in the randomness of choice.
In combination with more information on local balancing cost
and required customer acceptance rates, our results can inform
efficient pricing strategies for platform service providers and sup-
pliers that carefully take consumer preferences and engagement
into account. Our paper only considers some of the aspects of
smart electricity services. Other potential fields of application
include micro-generation, on-site heat and power and electric vehi-
cle technology. However, the findings of this paper could inform
competition authorities, regulators and smart service providers and
feed into future research in a smart grid context in which cus-































E(Bill Savings) (£) 0.674∗∗∗
AIC 23,591.4
BIC 23,783.3
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗ p < 0.01.
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table K.2
MNL with fee-income interactions.
MNL




















E(Bill Savings) (£) 0.115∗∗∗
(0.00806)
feeXinc2 (£15k − £52k p.a.) 0.00761
(0.0161)
feeXinc3 (> £52k p.a.) 0.0649∗∗
(0.0247)
feeXinc4 (refused to say) −0.0435*
(0.0281)
N 45,408
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
The table lists the results from a MNL model with
fee-income interactions. The coefficients of these
interactions suggest a sensitivity to the fee that is
lower for high income consumers. Reference group
for income is the category with less than £15k p.a.
∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗ p < 0.01.






P(y1i < 0) 7.19%
monitor3 −0.54
SDi 0.08
P(y2i > 0) 0%
control2 −0.13
SDi 0.45
P(y3i ≶ 0) 38.63
control3 −0.51
SDi 1.11
P(y4i > 0) 32.3%
support2 0.49
SDi 0.31
P(y5i < 0) 5.7%
support3 0.50
SDi 0.07
P(y6i < 0) 0%
privacy2 −1.07
SDi 1.12
P(y7i > 0) 16.97%
privacy3 −0.53
SDi 1.66
P(y8i > 0) 37.48%
Expected savings (£) 1.28
SDi 0.29
P(y9i < 0) 0%
Country England
Age 65–74
(continued on next page)









No solar Solar PV
Technology type Tech affine






Income (annual) 15,601 to 52,000
Survey time (sec) 1041
sp time (min) 6.15
Mean confidence 2
Above average confident No
Above average understanding Yes
Above average realistic Yes
Gender Male
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.04.004.
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